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‘Freedom’ through repression: epistemic
closure in agricultural trade negotiations
JULIAN GRUIN*
Abstract. A central concern of critical theory is that of how the forces of Modern reason
cause certain logics to become reified in the name of rational progress. Two such logics –
the ongoing spread of liberal capitalism, and territorial particularism – are simultaneously
embodied within social institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that
regulate the global economy, a phenomenon that occurs on the premise of maximising
global welfare. Building upon a critical reading of Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communi-
cative action, this article undertakes an empirical immanent critique of the extent to which
such logics repress the possibility of normative imperatives being considered within
agricultural trade negotiations. Specifically, it argues that the dialectic of functionalist and
communicative rationality, operating as a theoretical heuristic, reveals that the DDA is
susceptible to an ethical indictment that arises from its inability to countenance the
alternatives to the dual logics of neo-liberalism and state-interest that could otherwise
emerge from a free and rational discussion. The nature of the WTO as a site of social action
is revealed to be that of a closed epistemic community in which important normative claims
are repressed, and as such, one in which the underlying rational bases for communication
are fundamentally distorted.
Julian Gruin is a DPhil Candidate at the University of Oxford. He is currently investigating the
confluence of neo-liberal and state-capitalist discourses within global economic governance.
Introduction
A core premise of the era of late capitalism is that the creation and sustenance of
a liberal market-based economic order by an increasingly universal ‘society of
states’ is indispensable for securing global welfare and prosperity. It is now fifteen
years since the World Trade Organization (WTO) entered the narrative of this
evolving global economic order, and nine years since the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA) was given the complex task of developing and overseeing principles
according to which agricultural trade relations ought to conform. Whilst consti-
tuting only a small portion of global trade in goods,1 agricultural trade is a
critically important sector of global trade for countries throughout developing
* I would like to thank Martin Weber, Richard Devetak and Samid Suliman for their intellectual
stimulation and encouragement, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments.
1 Kym Anderson and Will Martin, ‘Agricultural Tariﬀ and Subsidy Cuts in the Doha Round’, in
Crump and Maswood (eds), Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations (London:
Routledge, 2007), pp. 63–4.
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regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia in their eﬀorts to enhance the welfare
of poor, rural, agricultural producers.2 However, the breakdown of negotiations on
agriculture is the primary reason that the DDA has stalled; strategic politics,
intended to both thwart other participants’ proposals, and coerce them into
accepting one’s own, have eliminated the possibility of reaching agreement through
dialogue and consensus. The future prospects of concluding the round are
seemingly remote.
The negotiations embody opposing logics that give cause for critical reflection.
First, they combine the priorities of agricultural trade liberalisation and develop-
ment at the centre of a new global trade agreement. The causal relationship
between these two objectives is one of the most fiercely contested debates within
international political economy. How is it though that alternatives are unable to be
raised, considered and debated? Second, despite the universalising embodiment of
liberal notions of inevitable forces of economic progress within the WTO, the
territorial particularism of social actors serves to preclude the realisation of the
neo-liberal project as a global welfare-enhancer and thus assumed developmental
tool. Yet, if within the institutional structure of the WTO, the bounds of moral
obligation ostensibly coincide with national borders, why then is the DDA a
‘development round’?
This empirical problematic in turn raises a theoretical problematic. This is the
specific question of how it is possible to explicate how these logics have developed,
and what eﬀects they have in the everyday social world. In this article I address
both, being concerned with an exploration of Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory and
its limits, and an empirical examination of the negotiations on agricultural trade
liberalisation within the DDA. In doing so I make two arguments: the first,
theoretical, argument is that whilst it is necessary to ground analysis of the WTO
in a social theory that is both comprehensive in scope and intersubjective in nature,
Habermas’ dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality operates as a
theoretical heuristic for critical analysis, insofar as rather than revealing the
pathological development of social processes itself, it illuminates the oppressive and
negative eﬀects of this development. If used in such a manner, Habermas’
theoretical architecture enables a substantive yet anti-foundationalist critique of
actual social practices. The second, empirical, argument is that the analysis of the
agricultural trade regime and the WTO more generally through the lens of this
heuristic reveals that the DDA is susceptible to an ethical indictment that arises
from its inability to countenance the alternatives to the dual logics of neo-
liberalism and state-interest that could emerge from a free and rational discussion.
The nature of the WTO as a site of social action is revealed to be that of a closed
epistemic community in which normative claims are repressed, and as such, the
underlying rational bases for communication are fundamentally distorted.
These two arguments unfold over four sections. First, I suggest that the
importance of Habermas’ theory of communicative action lies in its enabling the
development of the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality as a
theoretical heuristic for empirical analysis. The next two sections, in undertaking
sociological and normative analysis of the negotiations on agriculture at the DDA,
2 African Union, ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2001), available at: {http://www.dfa.
gov.za/au.nepad/nepad.pdf}, p. 32.
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each contribute implicitly to the theoretical argument whilst simultaneously devel-
oping the empirical argument outlined earlier in the introduction. The sociological
analysis of the agricultural trade regime charts the macro-social characteristics and
trends of the WTO through the twin methodologies of systems and lifeworld
analysis. In relation to the theoretical argument, this achieves two things. Firstly, it
provides an insight into the limitations of Habermas’ critical theory in attempting
to chart diﬀerent forms of rationality as underpinning social action. Secondly it
provides an essential heuristic for the normative analysis that follows.
The normative analysis thus integrates the conclusions of the sociological
analysis into a discussion of the way in which certain contradictions and paradoxes
– emerging from the speech acts of social agents concerned with agricultural trade
liberalisation within the DDA – constitute violations of an ethics founded on the
presuppositions of communication and processes of argumentation. Finally, in the
fourth section I reflect upon both praxis and theory in assessing the implications
of the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality.
Universal pragmatics and the study of global politics
Universal pragmatics consists centrally of the notion that anyone acting commu-
nicatively must, in producing any utterance, raise universal validity-claims and
suppose that they can be vindicated.3 Being the reconstructive analysis of the
preconditions of communicative rationality and thus communicative action,
universal pragmatics is approached as a comprehensive social theory that can hope
to explain the generation and subsequent alteration of society; social life is seen,
at root, as being explainable in terms of the ability of actors to communicate
through the medium of ‘speech acts’.
Building upon Wittgenstein’s study of ‘language games’, Habermas thus begins
to examine the intersubjective structure of language. He argues that there is a
‘double structure’ of ordinary language, which is to say that in using language the
competent speaker must at once relate to another social subject, and to the matters
about which they are communicating.4 Speech acts have both ‘illocutionary’ force
and ‘propositional’ content – in eﬀect, one either does things with words, or one
makes statements about the world. Habermas’ contention is that this distinction
between mentioning propositional content (focusing on the intersubjective or
performative aspects of the utterance), and asserting the propositional content
(focusing on its truth) is necessarily present in all utterances.5 The success of a
speech act therefore centres upon participants understanding and accepting each
other’s intentions.6
Habermas’ intention in focusing upon the underpinnings of speech and
language is to ultimately develop a model of discourse within which language is
3 Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
4 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics’, Theory and Society, 1 (1976),
pp. 156–7.
5 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminiary Studies in the Theory of
Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 82–3.
6 Andrew Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p. 147.
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utilised by competent communicators in order to generate meaningful social action.
Habermas thus introduces four universal validity-claims that are entailed in any
utterance. The first claim is that of truth: cognitive propositional content. The
second is that of rightness: non-cognitive illocutionary content. The third is that of
intelligibility, whilst the final claim is that of sincerity.7 From these four
validity-claims Habermas develops a model of discourse within which claims to
truth and rightness can be assessed and therefore rejected or redeemed, and can
thus come to be ascribed to a proposition through discourse. Habermas is
concerned to present the communicative competence to achieve this not as a given,
but rather as a phenomenon with an explicable process of development, summing
it up as the development of a capacity of ‘diﬀerentiation between the lifeworld and
the world’,8 or an ability to question the otherwise secure assumptions of the
lifeworld and to treat one’s own assessments as contingent. As such it renders
universal pragmatics a critical resource by which to recognise illegitimate forms of
social organisation. Habermas argues for a consensus theory of discourse, whereby
a proposition is true (or right) only if ‘everyone else who could enter into discourse
with me’ would freely accept it as such.9
Clearly it is necessary to examine how Habermas’ social theory operates in the
practice of empirical critique as well as in theory. Maeve Cooke asks whether the
notion of communicative rationality provides standards that would enable us to
criticise the development of modern societies as pathological,10 arguing that it can
do so only indirectly. It is not clear that communicative rationality can be used in
order to reveal the development of pathologies themselves as they arise from
functional integration; it is perhaps only able to demonstrate the pathological
nature of developmental tendencies through their eﬀects within the lifeworld.
Cooke’s contention is, essentially, that cognitive-instrumental rationality cannot be
equated with functionalist rationality. As such, strategic action, insofar as it
instrumentalises other social actors, cannot be taken as clear evidence of
functionalist rationality.11 However, as universal pragmatics is presented as
discourse-constitutive, rather than merely discourse-regulative,12 Habermas seems
to suggest that the concept can do both. Accordingly, there are two main ways in
which the concept of communicative rationality can function as a yardstick for
assessing and criticising the pathologies of modernity. First, it provides a model for
the free interplay of the three dimensions of reason which he believes have been
diﬀerentiated historically, being cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical and
aesthetic-expressive rationality.13 Second, it rests on certain idealisations implicit in
7 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 68.
8 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,
1990), p. 138.
9 Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminiary Studies in the Theory of
Communicative Action, p. 89.
10 Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1994), p. 143.
11 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 143.
12 William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994), p. 212.
13 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Die Krise Des Wohlfahrtsstaates Und Die Erschöpfung Utopischer Energien’,
Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), p. 158., cited in Cooke,
Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 144.
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our everyday practices, which permit us to criticise actual communicative practices
(and perhaps also actual beliefs and normative judgements) for their failure to live
up to those idealisations.14
The introduction of Habermas’ critical theory into the empirical International
Relations (IR) research agenda has emphasised the second of these ‘critical
potentials’ in order to provide a normative basis in analyses of patterns of
communication and discourse for the critique of communicative practices of social
actors. As Nicole Deitelhoﬀ and Harald Müller observe, political theorists
welcomed the attempt to introduce normative theory and ethics to the study of
international cooperation but once again highlighted the necessity of integrating
the social theory of Habermas more thoroughly.15 When they undertake empirical
analysis of arms treaty negotiations, they realise that it is a mistake to confuse
discourse ethics with an empirical proposition and to thus attempt to transfer a
transcendental theoretical construct back into the hard facts of real world
diplomacy.16 This result is inevitable in the absence of an explication of the manner
by which discourse ethics establishes a socio-theoretic grounding in the historical
development and empirical context of the negotiations under examination. This
signifies the point at which Thomas Risse’s analysis17 breaks down as a
demonstration of empirically applying Habermas’ discourse ethical framework; the
true intersubjective nature of the theory of communicative action manifests itself
not simply as instances of communication, but as the basis upon which the
possibility of society’s existence itself is founded. The focus upon the rationality of
argumentation and the existence of a common lifeworld marginalises the notion
that even aspects of societal reproduction that rely upon the non-communicative
logics of social systems, presuppose communicative action as a counterfactual
source of meaning. Whilst more sophisticated and comprehensive, Andrew
Linklater’s most directly Habermasian analysis of IR focuses too little on this
social theoretic implication of Habermas’ dialectic of system and lifeworld.
Linklater supports Habermas’ defence of the unfinished project of modernity,
although he is concerned, principally, with the normative, sociological and
praxeological basis of a ‘universal speech community [. . .] tolerating diﬀerence
[and] and enlarging human diversity’.18 Linklater emphasises processes of social
learning,19 in the process under-theorising certain structural logics of the inter-
national system, particularly the dominating logics of a global capitalist economy.20
As a result, the force of the dialectic present within Habermas’ thought is
under-utilised as a source of empirically relevant critique.
Martin Weber argues that at the social-theoretic core of the Frankfurt School’s
project lies both a theory of individual social action and a theory of macro-social
14 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 144.
15 N. Deitelhoﬀ and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’,
Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), p. 169; H. Müller, ‘Vom Dissensrisiko Zur Ordnung Der
Internationalen Staatenwelt’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 3 (1996).
16 Deitelhoﬀ and Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’, p. 179.
17 Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization,
54 (2000).
18 Andrew Linklater, ‘The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory’, in Wyn
Jones (ed.), Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2001).
19 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 13.
20 Mathias Albert, ‘Observing World Politics: Luhmann’s Systems Theory of Society and International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28 (1999), p. 243.
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coordination, and crucially, a theory of how social evolution occurs through a
corresponding lifeworld-systems dialectic. It is thus possible to see the lifeworld,
being the generative source of individual action, as that which systems-integration,
(or the necessity of developing social structures), cannot subsume, and systems-
integration as a welcome development to the extent that it reduces the burden of
the reproduction of society that otherwise lies incumbent upon the lifeworld.21 This
raises the important theoretical point that a phenomenological account of social
action within a global context ought to strive towards analytical purchase beyond
superficial manifestations of communicative action, a task that is alluded to, but
not adequately undertaken in analyses such as those of Müller, Deitelhoﬀ, Risse
and Linklater. The deeper theoretical aspects of social theory provide scope for
attempting to explicate not only what communicative or strategic action might look
like, but how it arises as a result of social development.
In this context, immanent critique22 thus seeks to generate a standard for
critique out of the theoretical reconstruction of the implicit ‘structural’23 conditions
underpinning diﬀerent human relations.24 As a method of research, this standard
for critique is utilised by the critical theorist in order to look beyond the ‘facts’ of
social interaction, and instead locate normative lacunae inherent within discourses
that exist and are revealed through contrast to social reality, and thus represent the
social ‘space’ for heterodoxy to emerge and concretise. In short, the critical theorist
is concerned with the disjuncture between what an actor is saying, and the
counterfactual preconditions of their saying it.25 More importantly, the critical
theorist is concerned with how this disjuncture, in causing the disappointment of
the mutually constitutive normative expectations of actors, provides scope for the
emergence of distorted communication and resulting action creating real oppres-
sion and suﬀering within the social world. This concern leads to an assessment of
how the institutional setting of global politics may be enhanced so as to lessen this
disjuncture.26
In order to reveal these contradictions and disjunctures, this article first
explores the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality as it influences
the institutionalised structures of the WTO and the DDA. This constitutes a
theoretical heuristic for an analysis of speech acts of state representatives in the
21 Martin Weber, ‘The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the “Social Turn” in IR’,
Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), p. 203.
22 Immanent critique is a method which seeks, ‘by revealing the contradictions of claim and context,
to transform legitimations into emancipatory weapons’. Robert Antonio, ‘Immanent Critique as the
Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Development in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought’,
British Journal of Sociology, 32:3 (1982), pp. 330–45, 338. See also Trent Schroyer, The Critique of
Domination (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 30–1.
23 ‘Structural’ insofar as such conditions, being those that underlie communication, form the principles
presupposing its social relevance and thus the possibility of socialisation.
24 Alan How, Critical Theory (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 54.
25 As such a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ becomes a basic methodological principle for the critical
analysis of texts. See Ruthellen Josselson, ‘The Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of
Suspicion’, Narrative Inquiry, 14:1 (2004), pp. 1–28; Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations:
Essays in Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).
26 Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, ‘A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations’, Review
of International Studies, 31:1 (2005), pp. 127–40, 128. However, it is important to also note the
possibility of forms of instrumental action further then being required in order to manifest this
emancipatory intent as political praxis. See Nicholas Rengger, ‘Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes
of Critical Theory in World Politics’, in Richard Wynn Jones (ed.), Critical Theory and World
Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
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two institutionalised fora that are primarily responsible for conducting agricultural
trade negotiations in the DDA.27 Such speech acts are used to illustrate aspects of
the universal pragmatics of social action as it occurs according to the system/
lifeworld (or functionalist/communicative) dialectic manifest in WTO trade
relations.
Social coordination through the global trade regime
In this section I locate the WTO within a process of social evolution, and in doing
so, make the case for comprehending the WTO’s activities regarding agricultural
trade liberalisation through the DDA as a product of the interaction between an
economic system that sustains itself upon a totalising discourse of exchange
relations, and a lifeworld that is declining in its ability to provide resources for
alternative possibilities and courses of action to emerge.
Together, system and lifeworld contribute resources for macro-social coordi-
nation according to a corresponding tension between functionalist and communi-
cative rationality. Both forms of rationality underlie intersubjective social action –
communicative rationality in the latent presuppositions of communicative action;
functionalist rationality in the latent imperatives of functional integration. The
manner by which these forms of rationality undergird processes of social evolution
is linked to Habermas’ development of universal pragmatics as the presuppositions
of competent communication. It is Habermas’ contention that the same presup-
positions of an individual’s competent communication have informed the macro-
development of society.28
Thus, Habermas seeks to reconstruct historical materialism as a theory of social
(that is, communicative) evolution, rather than the evolution of the tension
between the forces of production (science and technology) and relations of
production (social classes formed by the way the ownership of the means of
production is distributed). For Marx, the dynamic of all social development was to
be found in this conflicting relationship, however such a restriction renders Marxist
historical materialism incapable of explaining the development of our intersubjec-
tive capacities.29 Since social evolution has been construed as a process of social
learning, Habermas suggests that a model for a reconstructed historical materialism
already exists in studies of the learning capacities of individual human beings.
Ontogenesis (the development of the individual) becomes the model for phylogen-
esis (the development of the species). In this sense the problem-solving capacity of
the society will therefore be directly related to the problem-solving capacities of its
27 The WTO document database provided the full minutes of the formal meetings of each committee,
as well as the full text of the majority of addresses made by individual representatives at each
meeting. Speech acts were selected for inclusion (although all documents within the empirical
research parameters were read) within the analysis on the basis of their embodiment of the tension
between the systemic imperatives of functionalist rationality, and the possibilities for understanding
aﬀorded by communicative action. In keeping with its post-positivist epistemological standpoint, this
empirical analysis makes no claim to verifiable truth, but merely posits the empirical evidence of the
dialectic within agricultural trade negotiations and highlights its ethically troublesome implications.
28 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique
of Functionalist Reason (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), pp. 153–5.
29 How, Critical Theory, pp. 134–5.
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individual members.30 The stages of the cognitive development of the ego identified
by Jean Piaget and the development of moral competence identified by Kohlberg31
– forming the basis of the universal pragmatics of communication – whilst not
mechanically mapping onto social progress, are traceable through the social
evolution of the human species. This theoretical framework for analysing social
evolution can be used therefore to trace the development of society through to late
capitalism from the perspective of both the lifeworld and the system.
Lifeworld and social integration
The lifeworld as it exists between any two or more social actors consists, at its most
fundamental, of an actor’s comprehension of objective presuppositions, social
understanding and personal competence that enables that actor to make sense of
another’s social actions, and thus create and maintain social relationships. It is
altered through modifications in the intersubjective understandings of social agents
as to the particular cultural presuppositions and understandings that constitute
their lifeworlds. This captures the point that the lifeworld as a whole is not some
form of macro-subject directing social agents, but rather is an interactive
achievement of those agents, and importantly, constitutes the possibilities for
knowledge generation aﬀorded by the counterfactual presupposition of uncon-
strained discourse within communicative acts and transmitted from epistemological
to sociological via the structural components of the lifeworld. Three such structural
components of the lifeworld can be identified. Culture is the store of knowledge
from which those engaged in communicative action draw interpretations suscep-
tible of consensus as they come to an understanding about something in the
world.32 It is linked to the objective world (and thus validity-claims to truth).
Society is the legitimate order from which those engaged in communicative action
gather solidarity, based on belonging to groups, as they enter into interpersonal
relationships with one another.33 It is linked to the intersubjective world (and thus
normative claims). Personality is the acquired competences that render a subject
capable of speech and action and hence able to participate in processes of mutual
understanding in a given context and to maintain his own identity in the shifting
contexts of interaction. It is linked to the subjective world (and thus claims to
sincerity). Habermas focuses on these aspects of the lifeworld because they
establish that we live in a linguistically mediated world in which the lifeworld
makes possible the derivation of meaning from speech acts. Human beings must
acquire the competence to distinguish the three worlds. The structural components
of the lifeworld are therefore the resources necessary to make and sustain that
distinction,34 and the reproduction of the lifeworld may therefore be understood in
terms of the interrelationship between the three structural components.35
30 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 120.
31 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 77.
32 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1987), p. 343.
33 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, p. 343.
34 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason, p. 140.
35 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 172.
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Analysing the WTO from the perspective of these structural components of the
lifeworld reveals that the structures of communication that constitute the WTO as
a social institution are rooted in the understandings that ordinary humans have of
objective (though necessarily contingent) knowledge, the norms that govern
interpersonal interaction, and their own development as practitioners of competent
communication. The cultural resources out of which consensus regarding the
principles underpinning the WTO can emerge is constituted within a historical
understanding and interpretation of the evolution of the global political economy.
This may be understood as emerging from the interpretations that participants in
policymaking processes hold of the history of the international trading system and
the global political economy in general; including the development of contempo-
rary economic principles, the demise of Keynesian economics, the failure of the
Bretton Woods financial system as symptomatic of the evolution of the relationship
between state, society and economy,36 and the ongoing evolution of the global
trading system during the period of neo-liberal globalisation.37 Culture as it relates
to trade liberalisation is thus historical knowledge, but more importantly, the
interpretation – uniquely familiar to each social actor – of how economic and
social forces have played out and their eﬀects upon both individuals and society.
Linked to validity-claims to truth, it provides resources for actors to assess whether
trade liberalisation achieves the goals set for it, such as economic development, the
satisfaction of political interests or economic integration.
The question of how society is understood by participants in processes of
international policymaking requires an assessment of the levels of solidarity that
exist between them, the norms and rules of behaviour that reflect such solidarity,
and the history of ideas concerning community and the social bond that generated
such norms. The individual’s identity within global society remains closely tied to
the Westphalian nation-state. As a result questions of how global society ought to
be structured come to be conceived by reference to the particularist aﬃnities of the
nation-state, and as such the state remains the principal creator and regulator of
institutions within global society, notwithstanding the growing importance of
non-state organisations.38 Nonetheless, conceptions of international society are
normatively fluid; the increasing role and significance of developing countries in the
post-colonial era, the growth of global social movements that transgress national
boundaries and what are recognised as potentials for cosmopolitan ethical
principles to underpin the structure of global society.39 Finally, personality
symbolises the agency that individuals within the global political economy acquire
through the circular processes of the reproduction of the identity of wider society
36 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36 (1982).
37 John G. Ruggie, ‘At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic
Stability in the New World Economy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24 (1994).
38 Andrew Linklater, ‘Towards a Critical Historical Sociology of Transnational Harm’, in Hobden and
Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), p. 165.
39 See Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and
Future Shock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Andrew Linklater, The Transforma-
tion of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1998).
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and the socialisation of the individual’s identity within that wider society. This
agency is reflected in the ability of policymakers to achieve a harmony between the
policies that they advocate through speech-acts (thereby creating their identity) and
the identity of global society.
The reproduction of the global political economy as global society can thus be
seen as an evolving constellation of these three lifeworld components. The
development of the personal identity of social actors motivates their attitudes
towards the normative structures of society, and allows them to interpret, discuss
and constitute an objective world. A successful society not only entails legitimate
ordering of interpersonal relationships, but also provides the individual with an
identity linked to membership of an identifiably integrated group, and makes
culture possible by being the locus of mutual understanding through dialogue.
Finally, culture both transmits rational knowledge, and provides the source for the
legitimation of social institutions. The defining characteristic of the process of
lifeworld reproduction is that of the prevalence of communicative action, these
three lifeworld domains being incapable of reproduction through strategic action
exclusively.40
This account is still incomplete for it neglects the social evolutionary dimension
that arises through the inherent potential of lifeworlds to become increasingly
rational. Habermas examines a hypothetical society, totally integrated and held
together by sacred ritual such that the cultural beliefs, social practices and
personalities of all social agents are rendered completely uniform. Social agents are
unable to raise or challenge validity-claims. Social evolution as the rationalisation
of the lifeworld is thus the gradual emergence out of this imaginary condition of
total solidarity – a ‘linguistification of the sacred’.41 Interpretations and practices
are increasingly detached from existing normative and historical contexts and
justificatory procedures increasingly rely on open and critical argumentation.42
Rational critique replaces dogmatism and conservatism. If an imaginary world of
total social integration is the beginning of this journey, then a wholly rationalised
lifeworld is its ‘vanishing point’.43
From this perspective, the rise of liberalism is seen as the development of
individual freedoms and the ability of individuals to use these freedoms to
challenge societal norms.44 In turn, the WTO is a political body that is charged
with protecting these liberal freedoms.45 Intersubjective understanding as to the
role of sovereignty, borders and administrative control in developing and managing
trade relations is manifest in the legal norms underpinning the WTO as a social
institution. It is a forum for the expression of views, in which economic history is
distilled into policy objectives that are formed according to the development of
40 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 133.
41 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason, p. 77ﬀ.
42 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 134.
43 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason, p. 146.
44 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’,
Praxis International, 12 (1992), p. 10.
45 Miguel F. Lengyel and Diana Tussie, ‘Developing Countries’, Making Global Trade a Tool for
Development (Geneva: World Bank, 2002).
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competence on the part of state representatives to articulate and justify them.46 As
such, the increasing participation and independence of developing countries within
the WTO, leading to a greater willingness to demand justifications for the structure
of global society are representative of a process of rationalisation emerging from
the development of state-based form of ‘communicative competence’. Throughout
the history of the pre-WTO General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT),
developing countries played a limited role in trade negotiations, whereas the
ongoing argumentation and deliberation of the DDA represents the increasing
ability of actors to utilise the resources of the lifeworld to raise, debate and redeem
validity-claims.
Systems and functional integration
The lifeworld of the actors participating in trade negotiations clearly does not
enjoy such a monopoly of influence upon the social action that occurs within the
WTO. Habermas argues that in its utopianism, the lifeworld is overly concerned
with how intersubjective relationships constitute global society, whereas it is also
necessary to examine how instrumental relationships provide the material resources
for these intersubjective relationships to form. Given that an account of social
development provided solely through the theory of speech and the development of
communicative rationality is deficient, switching to the methodology of systems-
theoretical analysis47 and the development of functionalist rationality shows that
the critical theorist can arrive at two possible interpretations of the process of the
evolutionary reproduction of society. In contrast to the perspective of the lifeworld,
which stresses the oppressive homogeneity of the early lifeworld being disrupted by
meaningful social action, a systems perspective stresses the manner by which the
transparency of the early lifeworld is clouded through the complexification of
society. The development of systems in order to manage this complexity gives rise
to a society dependent for its cohesiveness upon forms of coordination that defy
meaningful interpretation, to the extent that they develop beyond the scope of the
lifeworld, and thus are immune from challenge through the raising and defending
of validity-claims. This is a pure system, reminiscent of Adorno’s vision of total
administration, or a society where the lifeworld has atrophied (as Luhmann’s
theory suggests is the truth of contemporary existence).48 The complexification
occurs along two dimensions or axes: vertical stratification, which works through
power relations, and horizontal stratification that works through exchange
relations being established between the strata. From this Habermas extrapolates
two steering media within the process of system integration: power and money.49
46 Lengyel and Tussie, ‘Developing Countries’, p. 491.
47 At this stage it is not an ontological diﬀerence, but rather a diﬀerence in what Habermas calls their
‘depth of field’. Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Reply’, in Honneth and Joas (eds), Communicative Action:
Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s the Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), p. 253.
48 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, p. 353; Edgar, The
Philosophy of Habermas, p. 176.
49 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 179.
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Contemporary social systems are constituted through a diﬀerence between
system and environment,50 and are concerned foremost with autopoiesis, being the
self-referential reproduction of themselves.51 The complexity of the environment
surrounding a system means that this is predicated on its ability to bring ‘its own
complexity into an appropriate relationship with its environment’.52 The example
of the simple market illustrates the manner by which the complexity of a trading
system’s environment (the gamut of possible communications that would impact
upon the distribution of goods, services and ideas) is reduced within the system
itself so as to enable the possibility of large-scale social coordination. The
purchaser needs only present an abstract ‘quality’ in order to enter into a social
relation that provides resources for the material production of society.53 The
intersubjective element of this relationship arises through the recognition by the
participants that there is a basic distinction that gives meaning to certain action.
In the economic/trading system, this distinction exists between a certain monetary
value being suﬃcient or insuﬃcient; in the legal system it is whether action is legal
or illegal; in the administrative system the distinction is between public/regulation/
intervention or private/non-regulation/non-intervention.
The current analysis of functional integration is concerned with three systems;
the global economic system, the global politico-legal system and the domestic
political system. The global trading system, according to this theoretical ontology,
amounts in its simplest form to a logic according to which certain goods, services
and ideas are transferred for money. Since the establishment of the first trading
relations, the complexity and diﬃculty of attempting to provide for the material
production required to sustain society has been simplified by the functional
diﬀerentiation of society at a global level.54 The basic economic concepts of
absolute and comparative advantage are both rooted in the logic of diﬀerentiating
between societal roles that serve to simplify the process of physically reproducing
society. This process of functional diﬀerentiation would lead, hypothetically, to a
laissez-faire pattern of trade relations.55 The question of whether trade liberalisa-
tion is capable of elevation to a teleological goal of social action is reduced within
the trading system to a propositional question of whether more capital – whether
it be monetary or material – is produced, in order to reduce the complexity of the
system, and allow it to reproduce itself as a functionally diﬀerentiated sphere of
action in contradistinction to its more complex environment.
However, the global politico-legal system, being territorially rather than
functionally diﬀerentiated, remains capable of observing its environment not just
according to monetary relations but also in relation to conceptions of inside/
50 Mathias Albert, ‘On the Modern Systems Theory of Society and IR: Contacts and Disjunctures
between Diﬀerent Kinds of Theorizing’, in M. Albert and L. Hilkermeier (eds), Observing
International Relations: Niklas Luhmann and World Politics (London: Routledge, 2004).
51 This notion of self-maintaining social systems stems from Weber’s original observation that social
institutions can ‘take on a life of their own’. David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity,
2006), p. 157.
52 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Modern Systems Theory and the Theory of Society’, in V. Meja, D. Misgeld and
N. Stehr (eds), Modern German Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 176.
53 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 176.
54 See Kevin O’Rourke (ed.), The International Trading System, Globalization, and History (London:
Edward Elgar, 2005).
55 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order’, p. 399.
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outside and self/other.56 States provide a diﬀerent form of diﬀerentiation in the
global political system, one that is based on territoriality rather than functionality.
As an institution of global governance in which the state is legally institutionalised,
the WTO can thus be interpreted as forming part of both the global politico-legal
system, but also the domestic political system. An important point regarding this
characterisation is that the WTO amounts, in systems theoretic terms, to an
extension of the domestic political system. It is a member-constituted, and
member-driven organisation. As systems apart from the economic system, both the
WTO and the wider global administrative system are thus not functionally
diﬀerentiated, as the economic system is, but rather, are territorially diﬀerentiated.
The diﬀerences in political constitution between domestic and global society
render it possible for processes of functional, rather than territorial diﬀerentiation
to occur. This has led to the subservience of the domestic political system to the
economic system, and thus the goals of the state being defined in accordance with
reified monetary exchange relations. Whilst both power and money are non-
symbolic steering media within the political and economic sub-systems respectively,
power becomes to be defined in terms of money; that is to say, that power is
derived from money, an insight reflected in the phenomenon of governmental entry
as a participant in the economic system.57 This is a critical point; it allows
Habermas to trace the transition to capitalism as the coupling of political power
to the economy, so that the ruling class convinces itself that it no longer rules, but
rather acts in accordance with economic imperatives. Social integration is therefore
no longer achieved through an overt system of norms and values, but, ironically,
through systems integration grounded in the economy.58
This confluence of domestic political, and global economic imperatives, has led
to the state and its legal manifestation within the WTO being caught between two
opposing trajectories of systems development; the universal arising out of the
economic system, and the particular arising from the political. Nevertheless, in
both its roles – as global proselytiser of liberal principles, and as economic power
player – the state is preoccupied overarchingly with monetary gain, as its strategic
interests become aligned with the interests of the economic system in procuring
continued economic growth, and monetary gain becomes the objective that
coincides most neatly with the reproduction of the domestic politico-legal system.59
The relationship between trading system and the political system is described by
Habermas thus: the development of the nation-state
secured the boundary conditions under which the capitalist economic system could develop
worldwide. That is, the nation-state provided the infrastructure for an administration
56 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Diﬀerentiation of the Legal
System’, Cardozo Law Review, 13 (1992). In the context of empirical research in IR, see Mathias
Albert, ‘Governance and Democracy in European Systems: On Systems Theory and European
Integration’, Review of International Studies, 28 (2002), p. 197.
57 See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diﬀusion of Power in the World Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 3; Ferguson and Mansbach, Remapping Global
Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock, p. 23.
58 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 22–24.
59 As Hont observes, territorial states have evolved historically to become ‘international commercial
agents in their own right’. Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the
Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2005), p. 186.
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disciplined by the rule of law, and it guaranteed a realm of individual and collective action
free of state interference.60
This observation emphasises the role of the legal system as complicit within
processes of functional integration. The legal system, through the development of
liberal mythology,61 becomes implicated in the colonisation of the lifeworld,
precisely insofar as law comes to be constructed as a systems-medium transmitting
functionalist rationality in order to guide social action, 62 rather than – as
Habermas argues it has the potential to constitute – a normative lifeworld
institution organised through communicative action. As a set of constitutive norms,
law increasingly shapes the lifeworld to the imperatives of the economic and
administrative systems.63 Thus from the perspective of systems analysis the
guaranteeing of liberal rights is grasped as the institutionalisation of a market-
steered economy64 rationalised through the medium of law – in this case an
institutionalised lex mercatoria.
The foregoing discussion has theorised the development of social evolution as
anchored in a process of fulfilling the requirements for the reproduction of the
global economic, political and legal sub-systems of society. Each system is steered
by monetary relations, and communication within each is thus rendered meaningful
by its conformity with the expansion of liberal principles of monetary exchange.
The result is an inversion of ends and means; instead of a means to achieving
communicative understanding, strategic action becomes an end in itself, reflecting
the predominance of functionalist rationality needed to reproduce these systems.
As such the aspiration to universal justice that could be fulfilled through the
progressive reproduction of the lifeworld through rational discourse is checked and
ultimately subordinated entirely by the demands of the global trading system and
its interest in its self-replication as a model for the organisation of global society.
The colonisation of the lifeworld
In liberal capitalist society, the process of functional integration leads to the system
not merely uncoupling itself from the lifeworld, but returning to colonise the
lifeworld.65 According to this argument, the lifeworld’s colonisation is discernible
in the reduction of participants’ ‘horizons of meaning’ in trade negotiations to
gains measured by reference to the value of monetary relations, resulting in an
economic constitutionalisation based upon ‘the rule of trade and commerce
[protecting] profits above the right to life of humans and other species’.66 It is not
60 Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’, p. 2.
61 A. C. Cutler, ‘Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement in Private International
Trade Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24 (1995); Mark Rupert, Producing
Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
62 Jürgen Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of
Recognition’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), pp. 183–4.
63 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of
Functionalist Reason, pp. 365–7.
64 Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’, p. 10.
65 Habermas, ‘A Reply’, p. 250f.
66 Vandana Shiva, in Aga Khan (ed.), Policing the Global Economy (London: Cameron May, 1998),
p. 106.
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the existence of the market as such that leads to the colonisation of the lifeworld,
but rather the extension of the principles of market exchange to all aspects of social
life. The increasing ‘disembeddedness’ of the liberal economy from society67 is a
reflection of an inversion of the relationship between the economic system and the
lifeworld. Whereas during the era of ‘embedded liberalism’,68 the global economic
system remained somewhat constrained by the normative resources of the
lifeworld,69 through the growth of neo-liberalism since the early 1970s, it is
precisely the principle of exchange that becomes the core social institution. The
eﬃcacy of money as a steering medium entails that it does not act merely within
the sub-system of the economy, but rather develops to regulate the relationships
that exist between the subsystem and its environment (including the polity and the
legal system), and thereby becomes the steering medium of other, non-economic
subsystems.
The foregoing exposition of the relationship between system and lifeworld in
the global political economy provides the social theoretic basis for examining
actual social action. The next section therefore seeks to identify the normative
eﬀects of the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality within
negotiations on agricultural trade in the DDA.
Strategic action and agricultural trade negotiations
In this section I explore the normative repercussions upon agricultural trade
negotiations of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the system; a phenomenon
entailing the creation of a closed epistemic community in which the bases for
knowledge-generation are pre-determined by the requirements of systems-
maintenance. The nature of this community is witnessed in the actions of states
within the institutional structure of the WTO which – in raising specific
validity-claims that focus only on propositional (validity-claims to truth), rather
than illocutionary (normative claims) content, and thereby reproducing the closed
epistemic community – represent a distortion of the underlying rational bases for
communication, and as such violate the principles of discourse that all competent
forms of communication counter-factually presuppose.
Discourse ethics
The normative potential of universal pragmatics comes to the fore in Habermas’
elucidation of discourse ethics. Habermas suggests that whilst imbalances of power
taint communication, the ‘fiction’ of the discourse ethical ideal situation is posed
as a counter-factual inherent within the exercise of communicative competence of
67 Ruggie, ‘At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in
the New World Economy’.
68 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order’.
69 See Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (London:
MacMillan Press, 1990).
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social actors.70 Whereas in their use as a grounding for the exposition of societal
evolution, validity claims were analysed in terms of how diﬀerent forms of
rationality determined the nature of a response, the issue now is that of evaluating
these same responses as coinciding or deviating from the counterfactual that
universal pragmatics itself presupposes.
Discourse ethics refers to an explicit set of ‘rules of discourse’ which provide a
basis for a political concern with justice itself:
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in
a discourse.
2. (a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
(b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
(c) Everyone is allowed to express his [sic] attitudes, desires and needs.
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising
his [sic] rights as laid down in (1) and (2).71
Discourse ethics works by establishing a subtle relationship between the
everyday lifeworld and the abstraction of practical discourse. It recognises that
social actors have the capacity and the right to challenge not the cultural values of
the lifeworld as a totality, but problematic individual norms, in order to avoid the
potential oppression of a wholly reified lifeworld.72 The possibility of thus
challenging norms is, for Habermas, the moment of justice, grounded in commu-
nicative competence, and thus in the conditions of the possibility of society (and
thus the lifeworld) per se (as opposed to the concrete values that are constitutive
of particular social and individual identities). In this sense discourse ethics is a
minimal ethics. It cannot provide any substantial moral insight that does not have
its origins in a discursively constituted lifeworld.73
There are two principal forms of deviation from the discourse ethical ideal. One
is characterised by a conscious eﬀort on the part of one agent to influence the
discourse in their favour. Habermas sums such eﬀorts up neatly as one party
making use of privileged access to weapons, wealth or standing, in order to wring
agreement from another party.74 Such action, further including rhetorical action, is
not communicative but rather strategic action, whereby one party is treated as an
object to be manipulated, rather than as subjects with whom one communicates.
The other form of deviation is that of systematically distorted communication,
distinguished by its foundation, not in an overt intention to achieve a given result,
but by its grounding in the self-deception of one or more of the participants. Here
70 Jürgen Habermas, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in Thompson and Held (eds), Habermas: Critical
Debates (London: MacMillan, 1982), p. 272.
71 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 89; Edgar, The Philosophy of
Habermas, p. 158.
72 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 163.
73 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 63. It is in this important respect that
a Habermasian discourse ethics sustains its critical purchase, as a normative perspective concerned
with procedures, not substantive results. As Claus Oﬀe states, its goal is ‘not the positive
determination of the “good”, but the negative elimination of particularistic tendencies, preoccupation
with strategic interests, and cognitive narrow-mindedness form practical discourse’. See Claus Oﬀe,
Modernity and the State: East and West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 35.
74 Habermas, ‘On Systematically Distorted Communication’, Inquiry, 13 (1970), p. 206; Habermas, ‘A
Reply to My Critics’.
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Habermas comes closest to Adorno’s blanket suspicion75 about the impossibility of
communication in contemporary society, for the covert nature of systematically
distorted communication means that it may not strike the participants as
problematic.76 It can be analysed from both the perspective of communicative and
functional rationality.77 In terms of universal pragmatics, it constitutes an inability
to raise validity-claims to intelligibility and truth, thereby disrupting communica-
tive competence. From the perspective of systems theory, it arises when the
maintenance of functioning social systems demands the suppression of potential
conflict that would result from a challenge to power imbalances within the system.
This then is a microcosm of society. The imbalances of power and wealth that
lie at the core of contemporary society could not be rationally justified through
genuine discourse, which is thus repressed either through overt influence, or by
systematically distorted communication. The repression of the possibility of
discursively articulating its own legitimacy, and the ‘intersubjective acceptance’78 of
this repression by disadvantaged groups, is crucial to the stability of late
capitalism. It is to this process of repression in agricultural trade negotiations that
the next sections turn to.
The redemption of validity-claims in the DDA
In this section I examine two fora for communication within the DDA – the
Committee on Agriculture and the Sub-Committee on Cotton – that involve the
raising of validity-claims concerning the relationship between liberalisation and
development. I present the DDA as a development round committed to reforming
agricultural trade for the benefit of developing countries, so as to secure support
from these developing countries and its wider legitimacy. However the discrepan-
cies between the utterances that constitute this perception and those that occur
within the institutionalised discourse of trade negotiations, violate the ethical
presuppositions of those utterances, as they arise out of a repression of
communicative action that is traceable to the systemic imperatives explored earlier.
The course of negotiations in the Committee on Agriculture under the mandate
of the Doha Declaration illustrates the eﬀects of the atrophy of the lifeworld. I
discuss the results of an examination of the minutes of negotiation sessions within
the Committee on Agriculture during the period from when they commenced under
the mandate of the Doha Declaration until formal meetings ended immediately
prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005.
This analysis reveals that the negotiations on agriculture display a level of
systematic distortion of the communicative possibilities of a meeting of representa-
tives from countries around the world. Whilst this is necessary for the system of
75 For Habermas’ views concerning Adorno’s performative contradiction, see Jürgen Habermas, ‘The
Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Re-Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment’, New German
Critique, 26 (1982).
76 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, pp. 155–6.
77 Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminiary Studies in the Theory of
Communicative Action, pp. 159–64.
78 Axel Honneth, Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1991).
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political negotiations on economic issues to continue, it also means that the notion
of the DDA being a development round must conform to a model of trade
liberalisation amongst self-interested territorial states.
Agriculture is the most central issue for the DDA. Following the Doha
Ministerial Conference in November 2001, the Committee on Agriculture convened
a Special Session in order to fulfil the mandate given to the Trade Negotiations
Committee by the Doha Declaration,79 in which development was central.80 The
negotiations on agriculture are characterised by several groupings of countries that
loosely represent diﬀering views as to the formation of agricultural trade relations.
Broadly categorised, the US (US) and European Communities (EC) are the
primary ‘defensive’ participants, against whom the G-20 – led by Brazil, China and
India – and the Cairns Group of agricultural-exporting countries seek to secure
reductions in the three pillars of export subsidies, domestic support structures, and
gains in market access81 whilst Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) seek a
substantive role through which they can avoid simply being receivers of pre-
ordained tradeoﬀs between the major trading powers. The first major deadline of
31 March 2003 for agreement on modalities was missed,82 and the Cancún
Ministerial Conference failed to perform the ‘mid-term review’ function envisaged
at the Doha Ministerial, rather constituting a forum for confrontation and
stalemate in relation to the agricultural issues.83
In July 2004, after intensive consultations and negotiations, the Integrated
Framework was agreed upon that managed to restore a semblance of stability and
progress to the negotiations, but which did little to further the substantive aspects
of reaching agreement on any of the three pillars of negotiations. By the Hong
Kong Ministerial, modalities had still yet to be agreed upon, however gruelling
negotiations kept the Round alive, and the deadline was extended until 30 April
2006, fully 3 years longer than originally contemplated at Doha. After this deadline
was missed, in July 2006 another conference was planned in Geneva with a similar
goal as to that in July 2004, which was to produce a largely political agreement on
a framework for renewed negotiations. This failed, with agricultural subsidies again
presenting an insurmountable impasse, and the Round was oﬃcially suspended for
79 World Trade Organization, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’, WTO Document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1
(2001).
80 Alex V. Deardorﬀ and Robert M. Stern, ‘Enhancing the Benefits for Developing Countries in the
Doha Development Agenda Negotiations’, Research Seminar in International Economics: Discussion
Paper No. 498 (2003), p. 1; Dijck and Faber, ‘The Doha Development Agenda: Ambitions and
Achievement’, in R. Dijck and K. N. Faber (eds), Developing Countries and the Doha Development
Agenda of the WTO (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 1.
81 South Centre, ‘State of Play in Agriculture Negotiations: Country Groupings’ Positions’, Export
Competition Pillar, South Centre Document SC/AN/TCP/AG/1–3 (2006); South Centre, ‘State of
Play in Agriculture Negotiations: Country Groupings’ Positions’, Domestic Support Pillar, South
Centre Document SC/AN/TCP/AG/1–2 (2006); South Centre, ‘State of Play in Agriculture
Negotiations: Country Groupings’ Positions’, Market Access Pillar, South Centre Document
SC/AN/TCP/AG/1–1 (2006).
82 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder’ (Geneva: World Trade
Organization, 2004), available at: {http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd_e.
pdf}, pp. 11–2.
83 Grainger Jones and Primo Braga, ‘The Multilateral Trading System: Mid-Flight Turbulence or
Systems Failure?’, in R. Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha and Development: A Window into the Issues
(Washington: The World Bank, 2006), pp. 28–9.
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six months. Whilst negotiations recommenced in 2007, as of early 2009 there still
remained limited evidence of the possibility of substantial movement towards
agreement occurring in the near future.
This series of events is characterised by patterns of strategic action.84 From the
perspective of achieving a level of understanding that can reproduce the lifeworld
as it relates to development through trade, the utterances of participants are
essentially meaningless, for this lifeworld has been reduced to a set of understand-
ings about the role of the WTO that serve only to reproduce a political system
devoted to reaching trade liberalisation agreements. As developing countries called
for either ambitious reductions across all three pillars, or for renegotiated and
bolstered provisions on Special and Diﬀerential Treatment, developed countries
focused on strategic means by which reciprocity could be achieved and agreement
reached, regardless of whether this took into account the concerns of developing
countries.85 For example, the US consistently downplayed the trade-development
link during negotiations, instead stressing the need for all Members to assess their
own trade-distorting measures and the maximum extent of possible reform so as to
increase possibilities for compromise and eventual agreement.86
The normative implications of every utterance made within the negotiation
sessions of the Committee on Agriculture are relevant to the assumption that trade
liberalisation is the best possible means by which developing countries may be
enabled to achieve economic development through trade. The challenge to the
universalising tendencies of trade liberalisation raised by the fact that all forty-nine
LDCs are net food-importing countries whose food security may thus be adversely
aﬀected by the increases in global commodity prices87 gains no traction, as its only
meaningful implication for the negotiations is that whilst multilateral, and
therefore universal, liberalisation is necessary for the creation of agreement,88 such
concerns may have to be addressed through other, non-trade related means.89
Rather, it is only the validity-claim of truth (that is, economic eﬃciency) – that any
given proposal on agricultural trade liberalisation will or will not contribute to an
eventual agreement – that is discussed, and acted upon strategically. Statements
made by developing countries are only able to be interpreted as factual statements
of a lack of progress due to the strategic intentions of developed countries.
84 See comments made by the Representative for Australia on 31 March 2003, the original deadline for
agreement on modalities in agricultural negotiations. World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report
on the Eighteenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture Special Session Held on 31 March
2003’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/R/8 (2003), p. 2.
85 See statements by the representatives of Indonesia, Brazil, the EC and the US in World Trade
Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture Special
Session’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/R/9 (2003), pp. 1–7.
86 World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Fourteenth Meeting of the Committee on
Agriculture Special Session Held on 27 September 2002’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document
TN/AG/R/4 (2002), p. 2; World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Sixteenth Meeting of
the Committee on Agriculture Special Session Held on 24 January 2003’, Note by the Secretariat,
WTO Document TN/AG/R/6 (2003), pp. 2–3.
87 Ibid., ‘Summary Report on the Fifteenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture Special Session
Held on 22 November 2002’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/R/5 (2002), p. 4.
88 Ibid., ‘Summary Report on the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture Special
Session Held on 28 February 2003’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/R/7 (2003),
pp. 2–3.
89 For example, World Trade Organization, ‘Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative
Eﬀects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries’ (1994).
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It is therefore apparent that strategic action within the agricultural negotiations
can be explicated as a product of the functionalist rationality underpinning the
economic system. Whilst argumentation and debate occurs, all utterances are
concerned with the ‘end’ of maximising monetary values; forging a consensus that
will maximise global trade flows and monetary activity. Whether or not this will
improve the welfare of poor people in poor countries is a question incapable of
being raised and discussed, and in this manner the opportunities for free and
rational dialogue are repressed. Technical analysis is limited to the econometric
models dedicated to calculating the increases in global trade flows that will result
from successfully liberalising agricultural trade.90 The reasons that are given appeal
only to the common aspects of the social institutions created for the purposes of
systems integration (legal texts, previous negotiating outcomes), or by reference to
steering media (increase in monetary value) that have no normative content.
I now turn to the general nature of the validity-claims that have been made
during the course of trade-related negotiations on the African Cotton Initiative,
and contend that the normative aspects of these claims – whether or not ‘domestic
political considerations’ are a legitimate reason for defying eﬀorts at trade
liberalisation – are unable to be raised, discussed, and resolved in a free and
rational manner. Rather, it is only claims that truth – that liberalisation would in
actual fact be beneficial to those developing countries co-sponsoring the African
Cotton Initiative – which are capable of redemption.
Cotton plays an essential role in the economic development of West and
Central African Countries.91 In May 2003 a joint proposal was made by Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali entitled Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in
Favour of Cotton (Cotton Initiative) which called for two actions to be agreed by
the members of the WTO. The first was the establishment at the Cancún
Ministerial Conference of a mechanism for phasing out support for cotton
production with a view to its total elimination, setting a date for the complete
phase-out of cotton production support measures. The second was the establish-
ment of transitional support measures for LDCs in the form of financial
compensation during the period of phase-out to oﬀset the income lost as a result
of those subsidies.92
In the proposal, the signatory countries made clear their view that the initiative
was a clear manifestation of the objectives of the DDA – including the
establishment of a fair trading system which took into account the needs and
interests of the poorest developing countries – in the specific context of the cotton
industry.93 In this vein, prior to the Cancún Ministerial, the co-sponsors of the
Cotton Initiative circulated a Draft Decision Concerning Specific Measures in
Favour of Cotton with a View to Poverty Alleviation that reflected the terms of the
original proposal, and related those terms back to the substance of both the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in 1994, and the Doha Declaration
90 See World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Twelfth Meeting of the Committee on
Agriculture Special Session Held on 20 June 2002’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document
TN/AG/R/2 (2002), pp. 5–6.
91 OECD, Cotton in West Africa: The Economic and Social Stakes (Paris: OECD, 2006).
92 World Trade Organization, ‘Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton’, WTO
Document TN/AG/GEN/4 (2003), p. 4.
93 Ibid., ‘Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton’, p. 1.
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itself. During the Cancún Ministerial Conference, the co-sponsors of the Cotton
Initiative pointed out that the wording of the revised Draft Ministerial Text far
from reflected the proposed modalities submitted to the Ministerial Conference for
adoption in the Draft Decision submitted in August.94 Several weeks later, a
communication was received from the co-sponsors in which it was stated that the
proposed formulation in the revised Draft Ministerial Text ‘[did] not oﬀer any
basis for finding appropriate solutions to the problems facing the West and Central
African LDCs aﬀected by the subsidies granted to the production and export of
cotton’.95
The failure of the Cancún Ministerial to resolve the issue of cotton subsidies
was a symptom of the inability of major groups of developing countries (the G20,
led by Brazil, India and China), and developed countries (primarily the EC and the
US) to reach any form of compromise on general issues of agricultural trade
reform.96 Notwithstanding this, the negotiations on cotton over the next three
years demonstrate a consistent trend: that the claims made by developing countries
to the normative validity of their proposal are answered solely by reference to the
question of the benefits that will accrue from trade liberalisation. The immediate
separation of ‘trade aspects’ and ‘development aspects’ within the Cotton
Initiative97 was inherently counter-intuitive in the context of a round of trade
negotiations committed to promoting development through trade, but makes sense
with reference to the logic of simplifying negotiations through their reduction to
factual questions of ‘help or hindrance’ in the context of wider agricultural
negotiations.
Following the Cancún Ministerial, the WTO General Council reached the July
2004 Framework Agreement (the Framework Agreement) for continued negotia-
tions under the Doha Work Programme. In recognising ‘the importance of cotton
for a certain number of countries and its vital importance for developing countries,
especially LDCs’98 the General Council established the Sub-Committee on Cotton
(Cotton Sub-Committee) in order to implement the decision of the Framework
Agreement. At its first meeting, Chairman Tim Groser of New Zealand stated that
the basic task of the Sub-Committee was to conduct work on all trade-distorting
policies aﬀecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support
and export competition, as specified in the Doha Text and the Framework
Agreement. This had to be within the general framework of the negotiations on
agriculture.99 The co-sponsors of the Cotton Initiative consistently highlighted the
impact that ongoing cotton subsidies was having on the livelihood and future
prospects of cotton farmers, their families and those reliant upon the industry.100
94 Ibid., ‘Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative on Cotton’, Wording of Paragraph 27 of the Revised
Draft Cancún Ministerial Text, WTO Document WT/GC/W/516 (2003), p. 1.
95 Ibid., ‘Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative on Cotton’.
96 Bernard M. Hoekman, ‘The WTO after Cancún’, Intereconomics, 38 (2003).
97 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO African Regional Workshop on Cotton: Cotonou, Republic of
Benin’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document WT/L/587 (2004), p. 3.
98 Ibid., ‘Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004’, WTO
Document WT/L/579 (2004), p. A1.
99 Ibid., ‘Summary Report on the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton Held on 16 and 28
February 2005’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/SCC/R/1 (2005), p. 2.
100 Ibid., ‘Ougadougou Declaration on the Cotton Situation since the Adoption of the July 2004
Package’, Communication from Burkina Faso, WTO Document TN/AG/SCC/GEN/1 (2005), p. 1;
World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Fifth Meeting of the Sub-Committee on
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In response to these pleas, two trends emerged in the trade-related aspects of
the negotiations. Firstly, the position taken by the US was that trade reform had
little to do with the future welfare of cotton producers in West and Central Africa.
At the fourth meeting of the Sub-Committee in June 2005, the US representative
stated that it was the belief of the US that minimal price impacts on cotton result
from domestic support, and that instead, the sources of the problems in African
cotton-producing countries are largely comprised of increasing global competition,
serious internal developmental challenges, and flagging demand for cotton prod-
ucts.101 The second trend has been the steadfast insistence on the part of the US
that any result in relation to the Cotton Initiative can only arise through the
resolution of the issues aﬄicting the wider negotiations on agriculture. As of 2004
the US was committed to achieving ‘substantial cuts in trade-distorting support for
agricultural products, including cotton’,102 this was however to be achieved
through the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on all farm products, not
as a stand-alone sectoral-specific agreement.103
The development of this discourse within the Sub-Committee reflects the
predominance of strategic action oriented purely towards the redemption of
validity-claims to truth as economic eﬃciency, and the repression of opportunities
to raise claims to normative legitimacy. Only once this occurs, is it possible for US
negotiators to make sense of the Cotton Initiative in the wider context of
agricultural negotiations, for it can then be located within the realm of strategic
action that the US employs in order to fulfill the demands of the economic system
– the continued predominance of monetary exchange relations as a means of social
coordination. Thus, it can be seen that if the goal of the US, as informed by the
economic system, is to increase trade flows globally, then intransigence in relation
to the Cotton Initiative is explicable by pointing to its strategic role for the US as
leverage for extracting trade concessions in other areas of trade negotiations. The
question of whether or not it is normatively acceptable for the US to do so at the
expense of African cotton producers is one that is not raised in the course of
negotiations, because to do so would be to test the implications of a ‘symbolic’
Cotton Held on 18 July 2005’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/SCC/R/5 (2005),
pp. 10–11; World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Second Meeting of the Sub-
Committee on Cotton Held on the 21 April 2005’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document
TN/AG/SCC/R/2 (2005), p. 16.
101 Ibid., ‘Summary Report on the Fourth Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton Held on 22 June
2005’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Document TN/AG/SCC/R/4 (2005), p. 13. A sample of the
many economic analyses to the contrary include Daniel A. Sumner, ‘Reducing Cotton Subsidies: The
Dda Cotton Initiative’, in K. Anderson and W. Martin (eds) Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha
Development Agenda (Geneva: World Bank Publications, 2006); John Baﬀes, ‘Cotton and Develop-
ing Countries: Implications for Development’, in R. Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha and Development:
A Window into the Issues (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006); K. Anderson and E. Valenzuela,
‘The World Trade Organisation’s Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues’, The World
Economy, 30 (2007).
102 Charles E. Hanrahan, ‘CRS Report for Congress: The African Cotton Initiative and WTO
Agriculture Negotiations’ (Washington: The Library of Congress, 2004), available at: {http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21712.pdf}.
103 World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton Held
on 16 and 28 February 2005’, p. 19. World Trade Organization, ‘Summary Report on the Ninth
Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton Held on 31 January 2006’, Note by the Secretariat, WTO
Document TN/AG/SCC/R/9 (2006), p. 12.
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lifeworld of agricultural trade negotiators in a way that requires communicative
action, the resources for which can no longer be sourced from either the economic,
political or legal systems.
Seen in this light, the course of negotiations within the Cotton Sub-Committee
signifies an overt recourse to strategic action in order to resolve disagreements, in
a way that contradicts the status of negotiators as communicatively competent
individuals. The key observation to arise from this analysis is that the exercise of
functional rationality is presented as rational progress, and accepted as such by
those who receive the ‘benefit’ of the system as defined in terms of global exchange
relations. This now forms an epistemically closed community, in which the
imaginary potential of the lifeworld, conceived as the epistemic possibilities created
by communicative interaction between social agents, is rendered inert in the face
of systems-maintenance. It is therefore possible to level an anti-foundationalist, yet
nonetheless profoundly ethical, indictment of the political praxis of the negotia-
tions on agriculture within the DDA. The negotiations on agricultural trade in
general and cotton as a specific issue are founded on the presupposition that trade
reform through the DDA constitutes a means of alleviating poverty and promoting
economic development in poor countries. However, the manner by which the
possible issues of contention that arise from it are resolved, and thus the means of
its ‘validation’, contradict the ethical standards that universal pragmatics has
shown to be implicit in the development of that original presupposition.
Implications of the dialectic: theory and praxis
Praxis: challenging discourse through dialogue
Despite the existence and seeming entrenchment of severe ethical contradictions
within agricultural trade negotiations, the possibilities of achieving a greater degree
of ethical legitimacy within agricultural trade negotiations have not necessarily
been entirely exhausted. In essence, structure can never totally overwhelm human
agency, for the innate intersubjectivity of social action, even in reified structural
conditions such as within the WTO, means that the potential for understanding
remains ever present. Otherwise, not even the possibility of meaningful speech
would exist.
For Habermas the potentialities for rebalancing the relationship between the
integrative capabilities of the lifeworld and those of the system are to be located
in the public sphere of society.104 From the perspective of social evolution it
represents the realisation of the anthropologically deep-seated potential that lies in
social interaction and communication.105 The important point of praxeological
analysis in this sense is that emancipation is likely not to arise from a process of
self-reflection, enlightenment and social revolution as contemplated by a mono-
logical philosophy of consciousness.106 Rather it is to emerge from an intersub-
jective process of actual communicative practices within modern social institutions,
104 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere’, New German Critique, 3 (1974).
105 Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, p. 125.
106 See Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics (London:
Heinemann, 1971), pp. 82–122.
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gradually enabling participants to challenge and overturn reified social norms, and
thus give rise to an impetus for establishing normative institutions more reflective
of the ethical possibilities of free and rational dialogue. The essence of this process
for Habermas is that
fallible reason constitutes an important feature of the discursive struggle to reach
consensus; for it shows how rational consensus formation is achieved through the force of
the better argument. As such, there is no telos or final purpose to guide and regulate
human conduct; only the progressive and open-ended formation of law, rules, and cultural
norms whose legitimacy is rooted in rational deliberation.107
The existence of ‘moral reserves’108 for greater levels of communicative action
within negotiations can be discerned in the capacity of negotiation participants to
resist the suppression of their communicative tendencies that the pursuit of
systems-mandated factual consensus demands.109 The source of this resistance to
the overwhelming of the lifeworld by the system remains in the public sphere, in
the recognition that greater participation and communication needs to occur
between both civil society, formal structures of domestic politics and the
increasingly transnationalised bureaucracy concerned with international trade
relations.110 This reflects Habermas’ belief that future rational progress of modern
society may arise, not from a civil society drawing upon foundationalist assump-
tions, but from social movements that are committed to challenging established
norms without asserting the predominance of any particular ‘vision’ of the
lifeworld to replace them. Habermas argues that a series of interconnected global
crises, including the problem of managing an international economic system while
states continue to justify their actions by particularistic criteria, may ensure that
the notion of membership of the species will make further inroads into the sense
of loyalty to the sovereign state.111 This systems crisis represents an opportunity
for social action on the possibilities for reconfiguring the development of discourse
so that it arises not from the internal logics of systems reproduction but from the
greater normative resources at the disposal of communicatively competent indi-
viduals. In the face of this possibility, greater rational debate and argumentation
may guide the evolution of this discourse towards increasingly ethical procedures112
for determining the reconstitution of agricultural trade relations, in which
participants are free to challenge the underlying assumptions of both the
neo-liberal mode of economic development and the territorial particularisms that
limit conceptions of welfare to strictly defined moral boundaries.
107 Steven C. Roach, ‘Communicative Action Theory: Hermeneutics and Recognition’, in Roach (ed.),
Critical Theory and International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 197.
108 Andrew Linklater, ‘Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process’, Review of International Studies, 31
(2005).
109 See Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Collapse at the WTO: A Cancún Post-Mortem’, Third
World Quarterly, 25 (2004); Robert Wolfe, ‘Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Where the
WTO Is Going after Seattle, Doha and Cancún’, Review of International Political Economy, 11
(2004), p. 586.
110 Steve Charnovitz, ‘WTO Cosmopolitics’, New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics, 34 (2002).
111 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations
(London: MacMillan Press, 1990), p. 26. See also Barry Jones, ‘Globalization and Change in the
International Political Economy’, International Aﬀairs, 75 (1999), p. 358.
112 See Kenneth Baynes, ‘Deliberative Politics, the Public Sphere, and Global Democracy’, in Wyn
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Theory: re-considering functionalist and communicative rationality
Habermas’ dialectic of systems and lifeworld is a powerful heuristic for critically
analysing the progress of trade negotiations. Yet it is not clear that in the analysis
of the dynamics of the global political economy, it can achieve a level of insight
that reveals ontological truths regarding the history of social forces in the global
political economy. Whilst strategic action can be recognised by its reliance upon
instrumental rationality, processes relying upon functionalist rationality convert the
strategic ends of instrumental action into a means for functional reproduction. This
renders problematic the task of distinguishing between instrumental and function-
alist rationality simply on the basis that instrumental action is necessary for social
reproduction,113 for this may only signify the presence of cognitive-instrumental,
rather than functionalist rationality.
I suggested earlier that it is fundamentally important for an adequately critical
analysis to simultaneously constitute critical social theory. However, the empirical
analysis demonstrated that it is not necessarily as important for such analysis to
definitively identify the boundaries, elements and internal processes of systems as
if they were physically present. Seen in this light, the lifeworld is thus defined as
indeed simply ‘that which systems imperatives cannot subsume’.114 The acceptance
of the possibility of functional integration and the dynamics of systems makes
possible a critical analysis of the state of the lifeworld.115 Therein lies the critical
potential of the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality as a
theoretical heuristic for normative critique of real social action.
Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to explore the possibilities aﬀorded by casting a
critical eye toward the way in which certain social forces have developed along
rational, though unreasonable trajectories. Theoretically, I have argued that the
dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality that lies at the core of
Habermas’ critical social theory provides a significant degree of critical purchase
for the analysis of contradictory action within social institutions such as the WTO;
however it cannot comprehensively achieve all of the goals that Habermas sets for
it in such analysis. The critical potential of universal pragmatics and the theory of
communicative action can yet nonetheless be eﬀectively utilised as a heuristic
framework in undertaking a critique of patterns of communication and discourse
within institutions such as the WTO. Empirically, I have argued that there is a
significant disjuncture between the strategic action undertaken by participants in
agricultural trade negotiations, and the counter-factually ethical presuppositions of
that action. Furthermore, this disjuncture is explicable by reference to the
113 Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics, p. 146.
114 Weber, ‘The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the “Social Turn” in IR’, p. 203.
115 Michael King and Chris Thornhill, “Will the Real Niklas Luhmann Stand up, Please”. A Reply to
John Mingers’, The Sociological Review, 51 (2003); Michael King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s
Theory?’ in M. King and C. Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics: Critical Appraisals and
Applications (Oxford: Hart, 2006), pp. 37–53.
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predominance of functionalist rationality within the WTO. Finally, a praxeological
perspective provides scope for recognising that the resources for eﬀective commu-
nicative action have not yet been exhausted, and as such, the exercise of rationality
may still yet take reasonable form.
Those reliant upon agriculture for their livelihood in the developing world face
seemingly insurmountable challenges in contributing to the discursive possibility of
the future of global trade regulation. The tools of the critical theorist are limited,
and the task remote in many ways from the daily reality of those disadvantaged
by the systems of exclusion inherent within the modern political economy. It is
nonetheless both possible and important to recognise that if its governing norms
are to attain justification, then it can only be that which is achieved through
unconstrained discourse.
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